If A is B and you argue that A doesn’t exist, then it is incoherent for you to claim that you aren’t denying the existence of B.

Dennett claims that Qualia are “the ways things seem to us.” He sets out to deny the existence of qualia, “At first blush it would be hard to imagine a more quixotic quest than trying to convince people that there are no such properties as qualia…but I am not kidding.” (i.e. he is trying to convince people that there are no such properties as qualia.) He also says, “I don’t deny the reality of conscious experience.” I claim that “conscious experience” is, by definition, “the ways things seem to us.” Thus, when he says, “I don’t deny the reality of conscious experience,” that is the same as saying “I don’t deny the reality of the ways things seem to us.” But he claims, “[I am] trying to convince people that there are no such properties as [the ways things seem to us].” So which is it, Dennett?

A = Qualia

B = The ways things seem to us

C = conscious experience

Dennett argues that A doesn’t exist, but claims that he isn’t arguing that C doesn’t exist. I claim that B = C. Thus, his claim is incoherent unless you deny that B = C. I guess Dennett doesn’t think that conscious experience is the ways things seem to us.